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OUTSOURCING INVESTIGATIONS
Elena Baylis

This article addresses the InternationalCriminalCourt's reliance on
third-party investigations in the absence of its own international
police force. In addition to cooperationfrom sometimes reluctant
states, the ICC and other internationalcriminal tribunals have come
to rely on a network of NGOs and UN entities focused on postconflict justice work to provide critical evidence. The author
acknowledges the problems with third-partyevidence in the context
of the Lubanga case and notes that the use of third-party evidence
raises questions regardingconfidentiality and disclosure, the integrity of the evidence-gathering process, and the equality of arms
between the prosecution and the defense. The authoralso recognizes
the benefits of outsourcing investigations to willing and capable
third parties, concluding that the Office of the Prosecutor should
take advantage of embedded organizations' contextual knowledge
and local connections.
The author ultimately proposes two
approaches the OTP could consider to effectively use NGO and UN
expertise while maximizing control of its investigation: (1) the OTP
could insert third-party experts already operating in the relevant
areas into its investigations; and/or (2) it could develop a set of
detailed guidelinesfor the UN and NGOs to follow in carrying out
their investigations.
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INTRODUCTION

Much has been made of the need for the International Criminal Court
("the ICC") to obtain cooperation from potentially reluctant states to do its
job. Lacking its own police force, the ICC depends on state cooperation to
conduct its investigations, enforce arrest warrants, and carry out other basic
functions. If states balk at providing such assistance, the ICC becomes a
powerless giant, and so both scholars and the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor
("the OTP" or "the Prosecutor") have devoted great attention to the questions of whether and how the court can persuade recalcitrant states to participate in the emerging international criminal justice regime.
Less attention has been paid to the ICC's dependence upon a group that
is not only willing, but eager to provide it with assistance: a network of
NGOs and UN entities focused on post-conflict justice work. 2 Far from
requiring persuasion, this network has voluntarily provided the OTP with
investigative reports, witness contacts, and copious historical detail about the

1Luis

Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215, 221-24 (2008); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy
and Accountability ofProsecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 510, 527-32 (2003).
2 In light of the recent controversy over the expulsion of humanitarian NGOs from Sudan, I
should clarify the set of NGOs with which I am concerned in this article. There are a number
of NGOs that are specifically concerned with human rights and justice issues, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Global Rights, Avocats sans Frontibres, and so on.
These are the NGOs that participate in the post-conflict justice network I describe here. On
the other hand, a number of humanitarian and aid NGOs have specifically stated that they do
not provide the ICC with information, because doing so would "undermine their humanitarian
goals." Louis Charbonneau, NGO Expelled from Darfur Considered ICC Cooperation,
REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2009, available at

http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN16528406. My discussion of NGO participation in the post-conflict justice network should not be taken to include these organizations,
nor any others that are not specifically directed at justice and human rights causes.
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situations under ICC investigation. But these relationships, while mutually
beneficial, are hardly free of conflict or controversy.
To wit, after years of anticipation building up to the ICC's first trial, a
crisis almost derailed it before it began. The OTP had not turned over to the
Defense certain potentially exculpatory evidence received from third parties,
as required by the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Indeed, not only
had the OTP failed to do so, it was unable to do so because it had obtained
that evidence from third parties under confidentiality agreements that
prevented it from divulging the information either to opposing counsel or to
the court. As a result, the Trial Chamber ruled a fair trial could not be had
under the circumstances, indefinitely stayed the proceedings, and ordered the
defendant released.4 (Spoiler alert: For those not following the case, the
Prosecutor eventually managed to secure the agreement of the third parties to
divulge redacted versions of the evidence, and the trial has begun. )
These events directed international attention upon the powers of the
Prosecutor, the ICC's fair trial protections for defendants, and the dangers of
such nondisclosure arrangements. In one sense, the crisis in the Lubanga
case can be understood as a consequence of an internal conflict within the
ICC's Rome Statute, which permits confidentiality agreements for the purpose of obtaining certain evidence (art. 54(3)(e)), but also mandates disclosure of all potentially exculpatory evidence (art. 67(2)). In Alex Whiting's
article, Lead Evidence and Discovery before the International Criminal
Court, written for UCLA School of Law's Symposium on Trends and Tensions in International Criminal Procedure, he has thoughtfully considered
these issues and their implications for the ICC and the Lubanga case.6
The Lubanga case also brought to light a more far-reaching phenomeOne indication of the enthusiasm amongst independent actors for providing information to
the ICC is that in the first year of the court's existence, it received 499 communications concerning alleged atrocities; all were from individuals or NGOs. Communications Received by
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (July 16, 2003),
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/I 64/28435.html.
4 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-061486-ENG.pdf; Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12, Decision on
the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Oct. 21, 2008) available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-1487-ENG.pdf.
s See Democratic Republic of Congo: ICC-01/04-01/06, Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo: Trial, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations+and+cases (follow case
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
6 See Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery before the InternationalCriminal Court:
The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207 (2009).
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non: the role of an extensive network of third parties who have been investigating atrocities and providing the evidence they gather to internationalized
(international and hybrid)7 and national courts. My purposes in this article
are to recognize and consider the contours of this phenomenon and to
explore briefly its causes and implications.
At the outset, I should clarify the sort of third-party evidence and investigations at issue. Sometimes distinctions are drawn, for example, between
information provided by eyewitnesses and by experts, or between witness
testimony and documentary or physical data. My focus in this article,
however, is not on such distinctions between different types of proof, but rather, on how evidence has been acquired in the first place. On the one hand,
there is information that has been gathered from its original sources by ICC
investigators in the course of the OTP's formal investigation, whether in the
form of witness testimony, forensic studies, documents, or something else. I
consider such evidence to have been directly acquired by the Prosecutor.
In contrast, other information is gathered by third parties in the course
of their own independent inquiries and then provided secondhand to the ICC,
either as individual facts or in the form of a consolidated report or database.
The crucial characteristic of such data, for my purposes, is that they are
initially collected from their original source by a third party and thereafter
provided by that third party to the ICC. Such third-party evidence and investigations are the subjects of this article.
A fundamental fact critical to discussion of third-party investigations
and evidence is that the ICC and the other internationalized criminal tribunals do not have an international police force at their disposal. This has been
noted before, but like the need for state cooperation mentioned at the outset,
it is usually discussed in the context of the need to enforce arrest warrants
and other court orders through national authorities.' Of course, this also
means the OTP must carry out its own investigations. Indeed, each of the
tribunals has its own investigators, typically within its Prosecutor's Office.9
Throughout this article, I will use the term "internationalized" to encompass both international and hybrid tribunals, that is, all tribunals with some international component. The international and hybrid criminal tribunals established thus far include the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, the International Criminal Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and, of course, the International Criminal Court.
8 Danner, supra note 1, at 527.
9 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 16 & 18 (May 25,
1993), available at http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary; Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda arts. 15 & 17 (Nov. 8, 1994), available at
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These investigators are tasked with doing the work that in many national settings would be carried out by the police: observing the crime scene, interviewing witnesses, collecting and examining forensic evidence, and so on.1o
By the nature of the crimes within the internationalized courts' jurisdictions, these investigations are inevitably both extensive and complex and
must be undertaken in the midst of an array of international, national, and
local organizations also functioning in the area. These other entities may
well be long-term players in the region and are often far more embedded in
and knowledgeable about the setting, the atrocities, and their aftermath than
the court's own investigators. Indeed, as the Lubanga case highlighted,
those third parties may have already carried out-or may be inspired by the
court's interest to carry out-investigations of their own.
In this context, while the role of national and local governments vis-dvis internationalized courts is not the subject of this article, it is important to
note that these governments are a critical part of the context in which internationalized courts operate. National and local governments function as
political authorities under whose sphere of control the internationalized
courts must function, as partners in the courts' work through cooperation
agreements and/or the formation of hybrid tribunals, and also as legal jurisdictions with an obligation to probe and prosecute atrocities themselves.
Third-party investigations have already played a role in other internationalized criminal tribunals, and that role is only growing in the ICC. Indeed,
the significance of UN evidence in the Lubanga case is so great that some
have argued the OTP has effectively outsourced a great part of the control

http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 15 (Jan.
16, 2002), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-uCindlMJeEw%3d&tabid=176; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 53 & 54 (July 17, 1998), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/romestatute%28e%29.pdf; U.N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor Reg. No. 2000/16 on the Organization of the Public Prosecution
Service in East Timor § 14 (June 6, 2000), availableat
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg0016E.pdf; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 23 (Oct. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KRLawasamended_27Oct2004_Eng.pdf
(investigations are controlled by investigative judges).
1oOf course, in some civil law systems, investigations are carried out under the authority of a
judge. However, in many civil law systems, the majority of the investigative work is carried
out by the police, and the role of the judge has been eliminated or substantially reduced. See
J.R. SPENCER, Evidence, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 594, 624-27 (Mireille Delmas-

Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
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and direction of its investigation to MONUC, the UN Mission in Congo."
Part A of this article discusses the use of third-party evidence in the ICC and
other internationalized tribunals.
However, the ICC's institutional mandate and resources, while critical,
are not the only factors that explain the increasing significance of third-party
investigations. This shift is also the product of conscious decisions by the
United Nations and NGOs to train for and carry out extensive inquires into
atrocities specifically for the purpose of providing evidence for prosecutions
in the new internationalized courts. Looking even more broadly, outside the
strictly investigative context, these developments are part and parcel of the
formation of a worldwide network of individuals, groups, and institutions
devoted
to
promoting
post-conflict
justice.
The
introduction of the ad hoc courts catalyzed the emergence of this network
and shaped its goal of producing trial-worthy evidence; the existence of the
network and its pattern of tailoring its work toward the hope of eventual
prosecutions are now in turn affecting the course of the ICC's work. Part B
of this article describes this phenomenon.
In one sense, the OTP's use of evidence gathered by third parties
represents both a recognition and a resourceful use of this network and its
investigative resources and skills. However, it also poses certain risks for
the integrity of the OTP's trial practice: prominently, of course, the issues of
evidence disclosure that arose in the Lubanga case, but also questions concerning prosecutorial strategy, the integrity of the evidence-gathering
process, and the equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense.
Part C assesses the risks and rewards of relying on third-party investigations.
I conclude that, despite the risks, the OTP should take advantage of the
expertise and local connections offered by embedded third parties, and I
propose approaches the OTP might consider in the future to do so
effectively.

I.

A.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY INVESTIGATIONS AND EVIDENCE

Use in Other InternationalizedTribunals

The use of third parties' investigations and evidence by internationalized criminal courts is nothing new. The phenomenon can be tracked in
' See Heikelina Verijn Stuart, The ICC in Trouble, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 409, 412-14
(2008); Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, WORLD
AFF., Spring 2009, at 23, 30-3 1.
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both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), as well as the
Special Court for Sierra Leone ("Special Court" or "SCSL"), and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC"). The ICC
has continued and expanded this practice.
At a fundamental level, the results of UN investigations have formed the
basis for creating many of the internationalized tribunals. In establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the UN Security Council relied
on the reports of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the UN Commission
on Human Rights detailing the results of his probe into the genocide.' 2
Similarly, an International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor appointed
by the UN Commission on Human Rights recommended establishing an
international tribunal, as did a Group of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General to consider the Khmer Rouge atrocities in Cambodia. 3
Furthermore, prosecutors in the internationalized tribunals have long
used third-party investigations as a foundation for their own work. For
example, in Kosovo in 1999, the Kosovo Humanitarian Law Documentation
Project interviewed thousands of witnesses and produced a database which it
turned over to the ICTY.14 Such information can provide an initial map of
the atrocities and a preliminary witness list as prosecutors determine where
to begin and how to structure their investigations. Similarly, the Documentation Center of Cambodia has collected and created databases of facts
gathered from hundreds of thousands of pages of primary Khmer Rouge
documents, as well as thousands of photographs.' 5 One of the Center's
2 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, delivered to
the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/49/508, Annexes I & II (Oct.
13, 1994). The Security Council also created the ICTY after designating a Commission of
Experts to delve into the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, although it decided given the
exigencies of the situation not to wait for the Commission's report before moving forward
with the tribunal. The relevant Security Council resolution does, however, direct the Commission to "continue on an urgent basis the collection of information relating to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law." S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
13The Secretary-General, Question on East Timor, delivered to the Security Council, the
GeneralAssembly, and the Commission on Human Rights, 153, U.N. Doc. S/2000/59 (Jan.
31, 2000); Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 52/135, S/1999/231 (Mar. 16, 1999).
14 International Crisis Group, Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw in Kosovo 1999, (2000),
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id= 1865&= 1.
1s History and Description of DC-CAM, http://www.dccam.org/Abouts/History/Histories.htm;
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primary objectives is "to compile and organize information that can serve as
potential evidence in a legal accounting for the crimes of the Khmer
Rouge,"6 and it has already turned over thousands of documents to the

Office of the Co-Prosecutors.

7

Prosecutors have also submitted NGO reports directly into evidence in
some instances. However, this use has been strictly limited by the internationalized tribunals themselves, in various ways. In the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, prosecutors have presented NGO reports on the conflict as
evidence in the Charles Taylor trial, including reports by Human Rights
Watch, Medicins sans Frontibres, Amnesty International, and Physicians for
Human Rights.' 8 Like the Kosovo Humanitarian Law Documentation
Project, the NGO No Peace Without Justice undertook a comprehensive,
nationwide Conflict Mapping Program in Sierra Leone documenting thousands of incidents of violations of international humanitarian law and consolidating its findings into a report. This report was admitted directly into
evidence in at least one case, rather than being used solely for investigative
purposes.19 However, under the Special Court's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, these reports are admissible only if they amount to background
material: any non-witness testimony cannot be used to prove the "acts or
conduct of the accused." 2 0 This of course has dramatically limited the scope
of third-party material that can be admitted and the significance of its role in
the Sierra Leone trials.
Similarly, the ICTY also admitted NGO reports in a limited manner,
permitting the admission of NGO reports tendered through a witness, so long
as the witness had drafted the report and conducted the underlying investigation herself. 21 However, trial chambers repeatedly refused to admit other
The Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Expertsfor Cambodia establishedpursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 52/135, delivered to the General Assembly and Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/53/850 (Mar. 15, 1999).
16 History and Description of DC-CAM, supra note 15.
17 Documentation Center of Cambodia, Second Quarter Report, April-June 2009, at 7 (2009),
http://www.dccam.org/Abouts/Annual/pdflDC-Cam_1009_Quarter 2ndReport.pdf.
1 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Prosecution
Motion for Admission of Documents of Certain Non-Governmental Organizations and Associated Press Releases, %20-39 (Feb. 23, 2009).
19Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-447, Decision on Prosecution's Request to
Admit into Evidence Certain Documents Pursuant to Rules 92bis and 89(c) (July 14, 2005).
20 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Rule 92bis(1) (May
14, 2005).
21 Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Dordevid, Case No. IT-05/87-1/T, Decision on Vlastimir
Dordevid's Motion to Deny Admission of Prosecution Documents MFI P757, MFI P756 and
MFI P738, T116-9 (May 19, 2009) [hereinafter Document Decision].
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NGO reports that the witness had not herself researched and written, because
it did not have any way of assessing the reliability of the information they
contained.2 2 The trial chambers expressed particular concern about admission of reports based on anonymous testimony.23
Likewise, an ICTR Trial Chamber admitted a Human Rights Watch
report under the auspices of the testimony of its author.24 In so doing, it
limited the admissibility of the report and the testimony to "illuminating the
broader context of the events alleged in the Indictment" rather than "testify[ing] about the crimes with which the accused is directly charged" or
"deciding ultimate issues of fact." 25 In so doing, the Chamber touched on a
theme which runs through many of these admissibility decisions: it was careful to distinguish between admissibility and weight, concluding that if such
evidence is admitted, it still remains "for the Chamber to evaluate such
evidence and determine the weight to be attached to it." 2 6
Finally, in a contrasting approach, internationalized tribunals have also
drawn experts working for third parties into their own investigations to serve
as expert participants. The ICTY conducted extensive forensic examinations
of mass graves, which requires the participation of forensic experts including
archaeologists, anthropologists, and pathologists. 2 7 Physicians for Human
Rights, an NGO, provided the forensic researchers for some of these
inquiries. 28 Similarly, the prosecutors in the Special Court for Sierra Leone
have made use of investigators on secondment from national police forces,
including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 29 This is, of course, a very
different sort of use of third parties than adopting the results of their
22 Viastimir Dordevi6, Case No. IT-05/87-I/T, Document Decision, at I1 6-9 (May 19, 2009);

Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovid et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Evidence Tendered through Sandra Mitchell and Frederick Abraham, 1 21 (Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Evidence Decision].
23 Vastimir Dordevi6, Case No. IT-05/87-I/T, Document Decision, at
6-9 (May 19, 2009);
Milan Milutinovid et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Evidence Decision, at 121 (Sept. 1, 2006).
24 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on the Admissibility of the
Expert Testimony of Dr. Binaifer Nowrojee (July 8, 2005).
25
1Id. at TI 12-13.
26
d at 17.
27 Melanie Klinkner, Proving Genocide?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 447,
449-51 (2008); Thom
Shanker, Behind the War Crimes Investigation in Bosnia, ENCARTA Y.B., Sept. 1996,
http://encarta.msn.com/sidebar_761594923/the bosnian-war-crimes-investigations.html#app
earsin.
28 Melissa Connor & Douglas Scott, Archaeologists and the United Nations Tribunals, 19
CRM ONLINE 10, 22 (1996).
29 Current Missions - Sierra Leone, Sudann (sic), Switzerland, and Timor-Leste, 2006-2008
Biennial Review, http://www.remp-grc.gc.ca/po-mp/rev-revue/page II -eng.htm.
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independent investigations. Indeed, it illustrates the possibility of maintaining control of an investigation while still taking advantage of third parties'
expertise.
B.

Use in the ICC
1. The Lubanga Case

The Lubanga case has brought to light the OTP's extensive use of information gathered by third parties. Rather than using data collected by third
parties primarily as foundational "lead evidence" for its own investigationas a basis for conducting its own witness interviews or sending its investigators to particular crime sites-the Prosecutor has taken that information into
court as evidence, at what appears to be an unprecedented level. Information
provided by third parties apparently comprised at least fifty-five percent of
the Prosecution's evidence proffered to the Trial Chamber before the trial

began. 30
Furthermore, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber appears to have permitted
relatively unfettered admission of third-party evidence at the pre-trial stage.
At the confirmation hearing, the Chamber admitted NGO and other reports
over defense objections that they were anonymous hearsay the reliability of
which could not be confirmed. The Chamber concluded that such questions
go to the probative value of the evidence and not to its admissibility. 3 ' It left
itself discretion to make what use of the reports it saw fit, stating that it
would determine the value of this evidence "in light of the other evidence
admitted." 3 2 The Chamber did limit its exercise of that discretion at least in
principle, however, indicating that "as a general rule" it would limit its use
of anonymous hearsay evidence to corroboration, "mindful of the difficulties
that such evidence may present to the Defence in relation to the possibility of
determining its authenticity and accuracy."33
It is not entirely clear to what extent this pattern of heavy reliance on
and broad admission of, third-party reports is continuing now that trial is
underway. The documentary evidence disclosed shortly before trial that had
30 Prosecutor

v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Opening Statement by Defense in
Trial Transcript (Jan 27, 2009). Fifty-five percent is the amount given as having been collected from third parties under confidentiality agreements; quite possibly additional information was gathered from third parties not under confidentiality agreements.
3' Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, $1
99-104 (Jan. 29, 2007).
32
Id. at 1106.
SId.
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been received from third parties under the auspices of confidentiality agreements apparently exceeded 37,000 pages.34 The OTP's summary of the
evidence it intended to present at trial also relied heavily on third-party documents for its description of the conflict and the parties to the conflict,
although the discussion of particular incidents was based in individual
witnesses' testimony.3 1 Since then, a great deal of the trial has been held in
closed session, and many witnesses' identities have been concealed. Accordingly, review of the trial transcripts thus far makes it difficult to ascertain
how much documentary evidence has been offered that are third-party
reports, and how many witnesses have been presented that were either
initially identified by third-party investigations or are otherwise connected to
third parties. Nonetheless, in addition to the documentary disclosures
described above, it has become evident that at least one of the Prosecutor's
witnesses was originally identified and interviewed by MONUC's Special
Investigations Unit during its own investigation of the atrocities in

question.36
2. Other Cases and Situations
The extensive use of third-party reports in the Lubanga case does not
appear to be unique. Rather, there is a similar pattern evidenced in the other
Congolese cases before the tribunals. In the ongoing case against Germain
Katanga, the Prosecutor has also drawn heavily on evidence gathered from
third parties under confidentiality agreements. 3 7 Like the Lubanga Pre-Trial
34 Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Transcript (Jan. 27, 2009). These were
37,000 pages of redacted materials, indicating that the original volume was greater, and again,
this number concerns only the evidence gathered under confidentiality agreements and not
other, non-confidential evidence provided by third parties.
3s Prosecutor v. Lubango Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Submission of the Prosecution's
Summary of Presentation of Evidence (Dec. 19, 2007).
36 Lubango Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Transcript (May 20, 2009). Because
most of the witness's testimony was heard in closed session, it is not possible to ascertain
from the transcript whether that investigation was in fact the mechanism by which the prosecution identified the witness nor whether any documents from the investigation were introduced through that witness. The fact that the MONUC investigation was raised in crossexamination in words that suggested it was being introduced for the first time hints that the
MONUC investigation was in that situation used as lead evidence only. However, it is really
impossible to tell because of the heavy redaction of the transcript, which leaves only a few
sentences here and there from which to judge.
n Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Article
54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the
Defence's Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, I 52-64 (June 20, 2008).
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Chamber, the Katanga Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the evidence was
admissible, and that the defense's objections that it was anonymous hearsay
went to the probative value of the evidence, not admissibility.3 8 It stated
definitively that it would use anonymous hearsay evidence only to the extent
that it either corroborated or was corroborated by other evidence, but left itself discretion to consider evidence "from a known source" on a case-bycase basis. 39
In Darfur, where the ICC has encountered strong resistance from the
Sudanese government, the OTP has declined to do any investigating within
Darfur for reasons of security. 40 Accordingly, it has done most of its work
outside Sudan and has limited its investigation inside the country to interviews of government officials in Khartoum. A 2006 OTP report indicated
that it had conducted 70 formal witness interviews in other countries, in
addition to screening numerous additional witnesses and documents and
consulting with experts. 4' For information from witnesses within Darfur and
from the crime scenes there, the OTP is thus entirely reliant on reports from
the UN and other third parties. In particular, the UN Commission of Inquiry
provided the OTP with "more than 2,500 items, including documentation,
video footage and interview transcripts," as well as "a sealed envelope from
the UN Secretary General containing the conclusions reached by the Commission as to persons potentially bearing criminal responsibility for the
crimes in Darfur.A 2
The nature of the Darfur evidence also highlights two differences in the
kinds of third-party reports being used by the OTP as compared to its counterparts in the other tribunals. The reports proffered in the other internationalized tribunals have largely been public, published reports, and as such,
raised issues of reliability rather than confidentiality. In contrast, the thirdparty reports at issue in the Lubanga case were offered to the Prosecutor only
on the condition of confidentiality, and apparently consist mainly of firsthand investigations records, including witness statements, internal reports,
3 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolu Chiu, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, T1 134-37 (Sept. 30, 2008).
3 Id. at %1 139-40.
40 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05, Prosecutor's Response to Cassese's
Observation on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence
in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending Before the ICC [hereinafter Prosecutor's Response], l
19 (Sept. 11, 2006).
41 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed
During the First Three Years (June 2003-June 2006) %141-42 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
OTP 2006 report].
42
1Id. at 39.
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and the like. Also, the Lubanga evidence seems to have been drawn heavily
from investigations by MONUC, 43 whereas the rulings of previous tribunals
refer frequently to reports by NGOs. This pattern is not absolute; the OTP
also acknowledged assistance from NGOs not only in collecting information
about patterns of evidence and identifying witnesses but also in "collection
of evidence and provision of [witness] statements themselves."A4

C.

Why Rely?

Why is the OTP relying so heavily on investigations by third parties,
and what are the implications of this trend? On the one hand, this is an
inevitable consequence of the Prosecutor's targeted, sequenced investigation
strategy. The OTP has done a limited amount of investigation of its own,
and therefore necessarily must rely on third-party investigations both to
direct its initial design of an investigation and also to fill in the gaps in its
own work.
The Prosecutor has deliberately adopted a targeted, sequenced strategy
as a way of coping with the demands of its investigations. 4 5 The investigators focus from the beginning on a predetermined set of incidents and
suspects in a particular time frame, rather than exploring the situation
comprehensively. In addition, they complete their study of the first set of
incidents and suspects before moving on to another. The justification is that
the OTP must husband its resources and deploy them narrowly in order to
make any headway. Given the number of situations the Prosecutor is
currently investigating and the enormous scope of those conflicts (the DRC
trial chamber ruling making public redacted versions of a number of the documents that
had been obtained under confidentiality agreements credited roughly half of those documents
to MONUC. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Issuing Annex Accompanying Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings of 23 January 2009, (Mar. 23,
2009); Discussion, The International Criminal Court Five Years On: Progress or Stagnation?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 763, 771-72 (2008) (comments of Mona Rishmani). MONUC
has also been providing its reports to the Congolese national authorities for use in prosecutions in the national courts. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., MONUC Hum.
Rts. Div., Special Report: Special Inquiry into the Bas Congo Events of Februaryand March
2008,
H§
6.1-6.2
(May
2008),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/repbascongo.doc [hereinafter MONUC Bas Congo Report]; Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., The Human Rights Situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) During the Periodof January to June 2007, T 38-42
(Sept. 27, 2007) [hereinafter MONUC June 2007 Human Rights Report].
4 OTP 2006 report, supra note 41, at 93.
451 d. at 3.
4A
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conflict alone has been the most deadly since World War 1146), it is certainly
correct that the OTP cannot hope to undertake an all-inclusive examination
of each conflict. It is also true, as the OTP has pointed out, that each such
investigation is complex, involving chaotic social contexts, the need to
protect witnesses, the use of multiple languages, and innumerable logistical
difficulties. 7
In addition to the investigative complexities cited by the OTP, two other
factors are critical for assessing the OTP's present investigative strategy and
any possible alternatives. First, the OTP has already opened investigations
in four situations in the CAR, the DRC, Sudan, and Uganda. Thus, any
proposed investigative strategy should be designed to meet these commitments, at a minimum. Second, the OTP's present investigative capacity as
currently deployed is not sufficient to enable it to fully investigate these situations itself. Thus, any proposal that would call on the Prosecutor to end its
use of third-party evidence must also contemplate some expansion and
redirection of investigative resources.
With these circumstances in mind, I will consider two alternatives.
First, should the Prosecutor have responded to the "exceptional logistical
difficulties" of atrocity investigations by "reduc[ing] the length and scope of
the investigation[s]" 4 8 or by putting more time, staff, and funding into
them? 49 Second, if the OTP is going to continue to pursue narrowly defined
investigations that will not themselves produce all the necessary evidence to
bring charges against defendants, can it appropriately rely on third parties to
deliver some of the critical evidence, and if so, how? The first question will
be discussed here; the second question will be discussed in the final section
of this article.50
Some have argued that the answer is simply to reverse course and
deploy more resources: to expand the investigative staff and funding, to
place investigators in the field long-term rather than sending them on short
trips from the Hague, and to undertake more extensive investigations."' The
Prosecutor's targeted, sequenced strategy and its execution of that strategy
Simon Robinson & Vivienne Walt, The Deadliest War in the World, TIME, June 5, 2006, at
38.
47 OTP 2006 report, supra note 41, at 3.

46

48

id

49 See Stuart, supra note 11, at 414 (arguing for this approach).
5o Beyond the scope of this paper but nonetheless significant is the question of the criteria for
opening new investigations. Should the Prosecutor continue to initiate formal investigations
into situations that meet its preconditions, irrespective of its capacity to carry out those investigations with internal resources?
51 See, e.g., Flint & de Waal, supra note 11.

Outsourcing Investigations

135

have been the subject of considerable criticism, both internal and external,
that sheds light on this issue. I limit my discussion here to a few of the
concerns raised by those with experience either within the OTP or with
related investigations.
Some former OTP investigators have said that they felt frustrated at the
narrow scope of the investigations and at the limited time they were permitted to do preliminary assessments and to conduct their missions.5 2 They
contend they came across some information in the course of their work in
Uganda and the DRC that might have produced evidence to support a much
broader range of charges and suspects. However, they were not permitted
either to incorporate this information or to broaden the scope of their work to
pursue it further.s3
This critique raises two questions of legitimacy that are crucial to the
ICC's effectiveness at achieving its goals. The first is the question of bias.
The OTP has no choice but to prosecute selectively: it cannot prosecute all
suspects, nor does it have a mandate to do so. Particularly because these
prosecutions stem from divisive conflicts, this selectivity will inevitably be
perceived as favoritism by some parties. But whereas past internationalized
tribunals have made efforts to appear evenhanded in their choices of defendants (the SCSL, for example, tried three defendants from each of the major
groups in the conflict), the OTP has not made similar efforts to signal impartiality. It has not even taken what would have been relatively easy steps in
this direction, such as inquiring about the recruiting practices of other
militias when interviewing witnesses about Lubanga's use of child soldiers.
These omissions reinforce the perception that bias is at work in prosecutorial
selectivity and thus undercut the ICC's perceived legitimacy amongst its
constituency in the DRC.54
The second issue raised by the former OTP investigators' claims relates
to the legitimacy of the charges. There has been a great deal of criticism that
Lubanga was charged only with using child soldiers, even though his militia
(among many others) is infamous for having committed many other

52 KATY GLASSBOROW, INST. FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL

DRC: ICC INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGY UNDER FIRE (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/2075.html.
5 Id.; see also OTP 2006 report, supra note 41, at
3 (describing the Prosecutor's decision to
limit the Lubanga charges).
54 Stephanie Hanes, ICC Path to Justice Tested in the Congo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May
24, 2007,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164icc/28624.html; Human Rights Watch, Courting History (July 10, 2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62135/section/6.
JusT.,
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atrocities as well. 55 The OTP has always insisted that it was charging the
crime it could prove, which is a commonplace prosecutorial strategy. 56
However, former OTP investigators have specifically stated that given more
time and control in their investigation, they could have produced evidence to
ground war crimes charges against Lubanga for killings and rapes, in addition to the child soldiers charge.5 7 This claim has been given new currency
in the course of the trial, as sufficient evidence has been presented on sexual
slavery to raise the question of whether the facts presented could be
"recharacterized" to include those crimes and others.s In light of the notorious role of rape as a weapon in the Congolese conflict, including such
charges from the outset would have strengthened the perceived legitimacy
and significance of the Prosecutor's first case. 59
Also of especial note are two statements invited by the Pre-Trial Chamber handling the Darfur situation from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights ("UNHCHR"), Louise Arbour, and the head of the UN Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, Antonio Cassese.60 Both Arbour and Cassese
have carried out inquiries into the crimes in Darfur and thus have personal
experience of the sort of investigation the OTP might undertake there. Their
assessments also carry some imprimatur of authority-or at a minimum,
sobriety-in that they were directed to the court and not to the media or the
public. Both Arbour and Cassese hammered the Prosecutor's refusal to
interview witnesses within Darfur on the grounds that he could not satisfactorily protect victims and witnesses. Based on the work of the UNHCHR in
Darfur and other conflict zones, as well as the study done by the UN
ss Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: ICC Arrest First Step to Justice (Mar. 17, 2006),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/03/17/dr-congo-icc-arrest-first-step-justice;
WomensRightsCoalition.org,
Failed DRC Investigations
by the ICC Claim NGOs,
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/congo/20060806_en.php
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2009).
56 Rachel Irwin, Interview with Fatou Bensouda, ICC Deputy Prosecutor
(Jul. 31, 2009),
http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/07/3 1/interview-with-fatou-bensouda-icc-deputyprosecutor/; Katy Glassborow, NGOs Defend ICC Role in Lubanga Case (Dec. 1, 2006),
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=325843&apc state=henh.
57 GLASSBOROW, supra note 52.
ss Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Giving Notice to the
Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts May be Subject to Change
in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, T 32 (July 14, 2009).
5 Indeed, the Prosecutor's Office has acknowledged that it should "whenever possible, . . .
present expeditious and focused cases while aiming to represent the entire range of criminality." OTP 2006 report, supra note 41, at 3.
6 Situation in Darfur, Case No. ICC-02/05, Decision Inviting Observations in Application of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (July 24, 2006).
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Commission of Inquiry, Arbour concluded that "it is possible to conduct
serious investigations of human rights violations during an armed conflict in
general, and within Darfur in particular, without putting victims at unreasonable risk." 61 Arbour also accused the Prosecutor of failing to take into
account the protective role that an ICC presence might play in Darfur, arguing that "the promise of the ICC is that ... it has the potential of being effective during armed conflict and to contribute to the effective prevention of
current crimes and the reduction of violence."62 Cassese concurred, contending that expeditious prosecutions present the only possible means of protecting victims in this context. Cassese was also particularly concerned with the
loss of evidence, testimonial as well as physical and documentary, that
inevitably takes place with the passage of time.
Whether these factual claims are correct-that the OTP could readily
have gathered additional evidence in the DRC, that the OTP would not be
placing witnesses at undue risk by investigating within Darfur-is hotly
debated. Certainly, the Prosecutor has strongly contested these assertions.64
None of these critiques go so far as to claim that the OTP could entirely
eliminate any need to make use of third-party reports by expanding its own
investigations. Indeed, it would be virtually impossible for the Prosecutor to
abandon all use of third parties' work, at least as lead evidence, since it does
not typically open an investigation immediately after atrocities are committed. However, certainly at least some of those with direct experience in
these matters believe that the OTP could more effectively fulfill both its
justice-seeking and its protective roles by substantially increasing the scope
of its own investigations.
What is indisputable is that the OTP's investigative strategy has raised
fundamental concerns amongst its own investigators, amongst others
working in these areas, and with the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers concerned
with the Lubanga case, the Katanga case, and the Darfur situation. These
concerns include not only questions of effective investigation, but also of
legitimacy, of the protective and preventative roles of the ICC, and of fairness to the defendants.
Situation in Darfur, Case No. ICC-02/05, Observations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights invited in application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, 1 64 (Oct. 10, 2006).
62
Id. at 76.
63 Situation in Darfur, Case No. ICC-02/05, Observations on Issues
Concerning the Protection
of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending Before the
ICC (Aug. 25, 2006).
6 See, e.g, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05, Prosecutor's Response, at
19
(Sept. 11, 2006).
61
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Another approach to these problems would be to adopt procedures and
policies for use of third-party evidence in order to mitigate some of these
concerns. But before exploring alternatives, it is necessary to understand the
other side of this phenomenon. In addition to the Prosecutor's strategy, there
is another major contributor to the OTP's use of third-party reports: third
parties' deliberate development of investigations for the purpose of contributing to prosecutions. In the next section, I will explore the development of
that investigatory strength in the context of a transnational post-conflict
justice network.

II. THE SOURCE: TRANSNATIONAL POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE NETWORKS

A. The Networks
Investigative reports on atrocities are not coming to the OTP out of the
blue. Rather, they are the product of networks of organizations and individuals working on post-conflict justice issues, including some people and
entities who are devoted exclusively to investigation and prosecution of
atrocities, some who work on a broader set of post-conflict justice aims, and
yet others who are concerned with an overarching human rights agenda and
carry out some projects on post-conflict justice problems. I have written in
some detail about these post-conflict justice networks in the past, as have
others.
An example may help to give some sense of the nature and function of
these networks. As I have described in more detail elsewhere, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is the source of the ICC's first trial and four
of its defendants, there are a number of players operating in a transnational
post-conflict justice network. Participants include MONUC, the European
Union, foreign embassies and the associated governmental aid organizations,
several large international NGOs, local NGOs, and the Congolese

65See Elena A. Baylis, Tribunal-Hoppingwith the Post-Conflict JusticeJunkies, 10 OR. REV.

INT'L L. 361 (2008) [hereinafter Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping];Elena A. Baylis, Reassessing the
Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational
Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Baylis, Reassessing]; William W. BurkeWhite, Proactive Complementarity: The InternationalCriminal Court and National Courts in
the Rome System of InternationalJustice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (2008); Jenia lontcheva
Turner, TransnationalNetworks and InternationalCriminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REv. 985
(2007).
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government.66 MONUC, in coordination with the UNHCHR, has developed
a Special Investigations Unit. This Unit has the primary purposes of investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity and of producing reports that
can be used to publicize the atrocities, mobilize political action, and provide
the basis for eventual prosecutions. While MONUC has the most sophisticated and comprehensive investigative tools, it is not the only investigative
game in town. Many of the embedded organizations mentioned above have
taken on complementary roles rather than pursuing their own investigations,
but reports based on first-hand investigations of atrocities have also been
produced by Human Rights Watch6 7 and Amnesty International, 6 8 among
others.
Brutal attacks on civilians are commonplace in Ituri, a region in eastern
Congo where non-governmental militias, Congolese, and foreign government forces have battled for years. The DRC network has, accordingly,
directed a substantial part of its efforts there. 6 9 In one instance, a
nongovernmental militia attacked a civilian town, killing, raping, and injuring a large number of people; stealing property; and destroying their homes.
MONUC instigated an investigation, going to the scene, collecting physical
evidence, and interviewing witnesses. It produced a report, which it used to
kindle international outrage. This report has been credited with drawing
international attention and catalyzing the United Nations to increase the size
This network is described in greater detail in an earlier article focused upon this network
and its role in supporting Congolese national trials. Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 65, at 5459. 1 conducted research in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June and July 2006, and my
descriptions are drawn from my interviews and observations there, as well as the documents I
collected. For a more complete description of my research methods, see id, at n.79.
67 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, The Christmas Massacres: LRA Attacks on Civilians in
Northern Congo (Feb. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drcO209webwcover_1.pdf;
Human
Rights
Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo: Civilians Attacked in North Kivu (July 12, 2005),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0705.pdf.
68 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: North Kivu: No End to War on
Women and Children (Sep. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR62/005/2008/en/f23caedf-8e4a- II dd-8e5e43ea85dl 5a69/afr622052008en.html.
69 This is not, of course, to minimize either the level of violence against civilians or the network's work in other areas of the DRC, which are both considerable. See Jeffrey Gettleman,
Symbol of Unhealed Congo: Male Rape Victims, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at Al; Global
Rights, SOS Justice: What Justice Is There for Vulnerable Groups in Eastern DRC? (Aug.
2005), available at
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/SOSExecutiveSummaryENGFIN.pdf7doclD=
4123.
66
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and scope of its peacekeeping operation in the DRC. 70
MONUC also began actively pressing for national prosecution in this
and other cases, once the arrival of UN forces in Ituri made this possible.
The European Union has paid for national prosecutors to go to Ituri from
Kinshasa and has also funded the repair of the local courtroom. MONUC
investigators have worked with the prosecutor's staff to conduct interviews,
share evidence, and provide security. Avocats sans Frontibries has facilitated Congolese attorneys for defendants and victims, and another NGO has
repaired the local prison. The success of these efforts has been mixed at
best; while some defendants have been tried in the Congolese national
system, there are numerous reports of failure to prosecute in spite of overwhelming evidence, and of prisoners escaping from jail. 7 Nonetheless, this
example demonstrates the kinds of tasks that this network is undertaking; its
capacity for coordination; the complementary roles adopted by its members;
and its immersion in the details of actualizing post-conflict justice goals,
down to the tangible, pragmatic steps of rebuilding a courtroom and paying a
prosecutor's salary.
In this context, the ICC is a latecomer to the game. MONUC and many
of these other organizations have had a presence in this region for years.
They are intimately familiar with the justice demands and failures produced
by the Congolese conflict. However, the ICC holds one significant advantage that makes it a critical player whenever it arrives: the power to
prosecute. This gives it not only a prominent role, but also the capacity to
fulfill the aspirations of many of these other organizations. Accordingly,
although the ICC is a relative newcomer, it is a focal point of many of these
organizations' efforts.
I say "a" focal point and not "the" focal point deliberately, for it is important to understand that ICC prosecutions are far from the sole goal, or
even the primary goal, of these organizations' activities. Rather, they are
working on a variety of interrelated post-conflict justice projects, including
but not limited to prosecutions, and including but not limited to prosecutions
in an internationalized context. As described above, the network is actively
engaged in encouraging and supporting trials in national courts, albeit with
mixed results. They are also involved in a wide variety of programs to
strengthen the national court systems and improve access to justice. 72 These
70

Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 65, at 54-56.

71 Id.

Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 65, at 58-59; MONUC Mandate,
http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1892; Avocats Sans Frontibres in Democratic Republic of Congo,
72
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enterprises form the context in which atrocity investigations are embedded.
Jane Stromseth and others have described the extent and incredible complexity of efforts to rebuild national and local justice systems after conflicts, of
which ICC prosecutions are only one piece.7 3
Nonetheless, ICC prosecutions are an important piece of these broader
post-conflict justice efforts, not so much because of the ICC's present
accomplishments, but because the hope for what it could do has inspired a
flurry of activity. The creation of internationalized tribunals has catalyzed
the development of the post-conflict justice network described above, and in
particular, has encouraged it to focus considerable resources on investigations intended to produce trial-worthy evidence.

B.

Development ofProsecution-OrientedInvestigations

The process of developing prosecution-oriented investigations began before the advent of the ICC. Prior to the creation of internationalized tribunals, NGOs and other interested organizations aimed their reports at an audience of politicians, diplomats, and the general public. Now the existence
of courts committed to investigating and prosecuting international crimes
has inspired these entities to conduct their investigations and organize the
material into databases and reports in such a way as to make them suitable
for use by prosecutors.
Returning to the Congolese example, MONUC developed its Special
Investigations Unit not only to document the atrocities taking place in the
DRC, but also to provide admissible evidence of those atrocities.74 Indeed,
MONUC's findings are expressly directed at encouraging prosecutions at the
national and international levels. In its report on attacks on civilians in Bas
Congo, MONUC describes its findings as "primafacie evidence of those
criminal acts and human rights violations discussed herein" and urges the
Congolese government to carry out its own judicial investigation.75 It takes
care to describe its methodology and to define the threshold of evidence it
has required to describe an allegation of a crime or human rights violation as

http://www.asf.be/index.php?module=programmas&lang=en&id=142;
Global
Democratic Republic of Congo,
http://www.globalrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename-wwwafr index 41.

Rights

in

7 JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).

74 Baylis, Reassessing,supra note 65, at 54.
7s MONUC Bas Congo Report, supra note 43, at TT
20 & 122.
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"confirmed." 76 In addition to directing its reports to the Congolese government, MONUC has maintained the practice of securing witnesses' permission to share their statements with the ICC. 77 On the national level, these inquiries are only the beginning of a process of advocating for prosecutions, as
well as facilitating them with logistical and technical support and monitoring
trials.7 8 The Human Rights Division has also developed a database of
human rights violations for use by prosecutors in confirming accusations and
cross-referencing information gathered from military observers.
MONUC's investigations in the DRC dwarf the OTP's. The OTP states
in a 2006 progress report that it did an intensive one-and-a-half-year inquiry
in the DRC prior to filing charges against Thomas Lubanga, with over 70
missions and 200 people interviewed - but MONUC interviewed 150 people
and traveled to 30 towns in one 10-day probe of a single incident.80 It is
particularly striking that the former head of MONUC's Human Rights Division, Roberto Ricci, did not regard MONUC's capacity as sufficient to carry
out the needed investigations, even though it is apparently greater than that
of the OTP. He also described MONUC's commitment to the DRC as
"short-term," although its commitment has been far longer and far more
embedded than that of the ICC.8
NGOs have also directed substantial energy and resources toward
developing the capacity to conduct useful studies for submission to the ICC.
Global Rights, for example, touts its post-conflict justice work in the DRC as
including training "Congolese human rights NGOs to conduct investigations
into atrocities and to collect, organize and document critical information on
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC." 82 It also notes that it has been
"asked [by the ICC] to trace victims and witnesses" identified by a local
partner NGO working under its guidance "for further collaboration with the
court."8 3
16

Id at 120.

n Baylis, Reassessing,supra note 65, at 56.
78 See, e.g., ReliefWeb, DR Congo: MONUC - Lieke Lesole Verdict
a Step Ahead in Fight
Against Sexual Violence, June 4, 2009,

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-7STMWL?OpenDocument;
MONUC June 2007 Human Rights Report, supra note 43, IT 41, 71 & 78.
7 ROBERTO Ricci, CHALLENGES OF PEACE IMPLEMENTATION: THE UN MISSION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 124 (Mark Malan & Joio Gomes Porto eds., 2004).
80 OTP 2006 report, supra note 41, at 1 14; MONUC Bas Congo Report, supra note 43, at
1.
81Ricci, supra note 79, at 125.
82 Global Rights, GlobalRights in the DemocraticRepublic
of Congo,
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/FactSheet DRC.pdf'?doclD=2683.
83 Id.
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Another indication that this international investigative network is
becoming increasingly sophisticated is the development of formal collaborations and training programs. For example, in 2009, Interpol organized an
International Training Course for Investigators concerning War Crimes,
Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide. Interpol has also been organizing
expert meetings to serve the "increasing numbers of countries establishing
specialized units" to investigate those crimes.84 For its part, the European
Union is funding a program to "create a network of NGOs, investigators,
lawyers and other groups willing to share information and evidence about
people suspected of war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity or
genocide," and "helping to build prima-facie cases against a suspect so that
national police and investigators can quickly obtain an arrest warrant or
make an extradition request."85
Finally, the post-conflict justice network in the DRC and the international investigative network described above are interconnected with other
transnational networks of investigators, attorneys, judges and others. These
include transgovernmental networks of national actors who work within their
own governments with their counterparts in other states, 8 6 as well as transnational networks of foreign actors who intervene in post-conflict states.87
Thus, the size, scope, and complexity of investigations by third parties
have been increasing and in some instances substantially exceed the capacity
of the OTP. These studies are also now directed specifically at producing
evidence for the internationalized tribunals, including the ICC. Whether and
how the ICC should make use of this proffered support is the subject of the
following section.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE: DIRECTED RELIANCE

Third parties are now taking a very active role in investigating international crimes within the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction. These investigations are aimed not just at publicizing atrocities and pressing for a political
response, but also at prompting and directing prosecutions in international
and national courts. In contrast, the OTP has been deliberately limiting the
8 Press Release, INTERPOL,
Interpol War Crimes Conference Aims to Develop
Global Expertise, May 18, 2009, http://www.interpol.int/Public/
ICPO/PressReleases/PR2009/PR200949. asp.
8s Humanrightsblog.org, London - War Crimes Investigators, Feb. 18, 2009,
http://www.humanrightsblog.org/listings/2009/02/london war-crimesinvestigator.html.
86See Turner, supra note 65.
87See Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping,supra note 65.
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scale and scope of its own investigations, due to constraints on its resources
and as a matter of strategy. (It is worth mentioning that national authorities
may be taking a limited role as well, due to lack of resources, corruption,
political influence, a strategy of internationalizing prosecutions for political
purposes, and so on.)
On the one hand, this presents the opportunity for the OTP to take
advantage of a pre-existing resource: a network of third parties is already
immersed in the country and has contextual knowledge and on the ground
capacity that the ICC lacks. Why shouldn't the OTP outsource investigations to willing and capable third parties?
After all, the problems faced by OTP investigators are not unique or
surprising, but rather, are more or less what one would expect from foreign
teams sent into conflict and post-conflict zones for short-term missions. The
ICTR experienced similar difficulties, at least at the outset. In addition to
the other logistical obstacles, NGOs and UN entities already operating in the
region have an inherent advantage over the OTP in their ability to act quickly. MONUC, for example, has a permanent set of investigators in place for
the long-term in the DRC; in one instance, it had a team on the ground doing
an investigation of a set of attacks only days after the incidents in question
occurred. 89 In contrast, there will typically be a long lag between the occurrence of atrocities and the Prosecutor's decision to initiate an investigation
into a situation. Nor can its investigative teams compensate by being particularly nimble once authorized to act, since they must plan their work in new
conflict or post-conflict zones with each new situation. Embedded organizations also have the advantages of contextual knowledge that OTP investigators will typically lack and will have little opportunity to gain with only
short-term visits. Finally, there is no obvious reason to think that OTP
investigators will necessarily produce superior results to others simply by
virtue of working for the court; to the contrary, if given equivalent training
and guidance, one would expect investigators with long-term experience in a
particular region to have an advantage.
However, there are significant drawbacks to third-party inquiries as
sources of evidence. Two of the most fundamental concerns are issues of
partiality and process. On partiality, many of the involved third parties are
committed to promoting particular ideals and are not constrained by ethical
obligations of fairness to potential defendants. Concerning process, thirdparty investigators will typically not have been trained in the procedures of
Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda:
Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 115 (1997).
89 MONUC Bas Congo Report, supra note 43, at % I &
3-5.
88
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criminal inquiries. These two factors limit the potential utility of third-party
evidence, both because the reliability of the evidence may be uncertain and
because using the evidence may harm public perceptions of the fairness and
legitimacy of the court.
A third concern is the equality of arms between the prosecution and the
defense. The OTP already enjoys advantages over defense attorneys, both in
its resources and in the ICC's liberal rules for admission of evidence. NGOs
and other third parties are rarely directing their efforts at producing
compelling exculpatory evidence for international criminal defendants, so
marshalling third-parties to collect information is likely to increase this
gap. 90 Furthermore, there are marked problems of transparency and disclosure with the use of third-party evidence, especially evidence relying on
anonymous sources or obtained under confidentiality agreements. It is
typically more difficult for the defense to ascertain the provenance and
confirm the reliability of such evidence, particularly if it is not disclosed by
the prosecution until shortly before trial.
There are two ways the OTP could effectively use UN and NGO expertise while maximizing control of its investigation and thus of transparency
and reliability: (1) it could draw experts into its investigations from the UN
mission and NGOs already operating in the relevant areas; and/or (2) it could
develop a set of detailed guidelines for the UN and NGOs to follow in carrying out their investigations, and urge the pre-trial and trial chambers to
provide similarly detailed guidance concerning admission of evidence produced by those third-party investigations.9' Many of the risks associated
with third-party investigations relate primarily to control over the methods of
the investigation. By taking either or both of these steps, the OTP could minimize the risks of unreliability by maintaining control of the direction and
methods of the investigation, while gaining the benefits of third parties'
90 See Stefania Negri, Equality of Arms: Guiding Light or Empty Shell?, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 13, 46-55 (Michael Bohlander ed., Cameron May 2007) (arguing that equality of arms may be understood
either to require solely procedural equality or to require something approaching equality of
resources as well).
9' See Human Rights First, The Role of Human Rights NGOs in Relation to ICC Investigations, Sept. 2004,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intemationaljustice/pdf/NGORoleDiscussionPaper.pdf
(discussing NGO assistance to ICC investigations); Human Rights Watch, The International
Criminal Court: How Nongovernmental OrganizationsCan Contribute to the Prosecution of
War Criminals, Sept. 2004),
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africalicc09O4/iccO9O4.pdf (informing NGOs on
how to effectively provide information to and support the ICC).
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expertise and experience. Furthermore, taking either of these measures
would help maintain the appearance and reality of OTP control over investigations that is so critical for its credibility and for fulfilling its obligations to
victims and defendants.
In particular, by drawing experts into its own investigations, the Prosecutor would maintain control over the process of investigation and would
thereby maximize the reliability of the evidence produced and the transparency of its provenance. However, while this would resolve some questions
of partiality by drawing third-party experts under its own mandate and
ethical obligations, it would also raise new ones, by potentially compromising the OTP's own appearance of impartiality.
By developing detailed guidelines for third parties, the Prosecutor
would cede some control over the investigation, but would maintain its independence from other organizations. Unless the relevant organization is
committed to undertake a training program in criminal investigations, there
would still be some gap between the type of investigation done by the OTP
and that done by other entities, but the gap would at least be narrowed.
Presumably, this guidance could include ways of reporting evidence that
would eliminate the need for confidentiality agreements, thereby also mitigating some aspects of the equality of arms problem.
Neither of these proposals is a panacea. However, either option, or a
combination of both, would be an improvement on the present situation. For
the reality is that the ICC cannot afford to entirely exclude information
garnered from third parties, at least as a source of lead evidence. And even
if it did so, the ICC's very existence encourages other organizations to
undertake investigations in hopes that the information gathered might catalyze prosecutions, even if the Prosecutor does not use the material collected
directly. By issuing guidelines for third parties in conducting their investigations, the OTP could diminish the risk of contamination of evidence by such
independent investigations, while also increasing the likelihood that the
evidence produced would be useful to the OTP. By drawing third-party
experts into its own investigation, the OTP could regain some control over
the methods being used to obtain evidence, while also potentially benefitting
from the experience gained in the prior inquiries that will inevitably have
been done before it begins its work.
As it stands, the OTP is in a highly disadvantageous position in its use
of third-party evidence. Third parties have already gathered the relevant
data with no guidance from the Prosecutor as to methods or substance. The
evidence is to no small extent being turned over to the OTP under confidentiality agreements, making it impossible for the Prosecutor to fulfill its
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disclosure obligations and thereby jeopardizing defendants' fair trial rights.
OTP investigators are left to try to build on and replicate third-party investigations in short-term trips from The Hague without the benefit of third-party
knowledge and resources. Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers have repeatedly
criticized the OTP for its investigative practices, and one defendant was
almost released before trial as a consequence. If the Prosecutor needs thirdparty investigations to muster the evidence needed for trial, it can make use
of them more effectively by altering its relationship with those third parties
in order to maintain more control over the methods of investigation and meet
its own obligations to defendants and to the court.

